Action anticipation through attribution of false belief by 2 year olds

Two-year-olds engage in many behaviors that ostensibly require the attribution of mental states to other individuals. Yet the overwhelming consensus has been that children of this age are unable to attribute false beliefs. In the current study, we used an eyetracker to record infants' looking behavior while they watched actions on a computer monitor. Our data demonstrate that 25-month-old infants correctly anticipate an actor's actions when these actions can be predicted only by attributing a false belief to the actor

Toddlers favor communicatively presented information over statistical reliability in learning about artifacts

Observed associations between events can be validated by statistical information of reliability or by testament of communicative sources. We tested whether toddlers learn from their own observation of efficiency, assessed by statistical information on reliability of interventions, or from communicatively presented demonstration, when these two potential types of evidence of validity of interventions on a novel artifact are contrasted with each other. Eighteen-month-old infants observed two adults, one operating the artifact by a method that was more efficient (2/3 probability of success) than that of the other (1/3 probability of success). Compared to the Baseline condition, in which communicative signals were not employed, infants tended to choose the less reliable method to operate the artifact when this method was demonstrated in a communicative manner in the Experimental condition. This finding demonstrates that, in certain circumstances, communicative sanctioning of reliability may override statistical evidence for young learners. Such a bias can serve fast and efficient transmission of knowledge between generations

Oscillatory activity in the infant brain reflects object maintenance

The apparent failure of infants to understand "object permanence" by reaching for hidden objects is perhaps the most striking and debated phenomenon in cognitive development. Of particular interest is the extent to which infants perceive and remember objects in a similar way to that of adults. Here we report two findings that clarify infant object processing. The first is that 6-mo-old infants are sensitive to visual cues to occlusion, particularly gradual deletion. The second finding is that oscillatory electroencephalogram activity recorded over right temporal channels is involved in object maintenance. This effect occurs only after disappearance in a manner consistent with occlusion and the object's continued existence

The development and neural basis of referential gaze perception

Infants are sensitive to the referential information conveyed by others’ eye gaze, which could be one of the developmental foundations of theory of mind. To investigate the neural correlates of gaze–object relations, we recorded ERPs from adults and 9-month-old infants while they watched scenes containing gaze shifts either towards or away from the location of a preceding object. In adults, object-incongruent gaze shifts elicited enhanced ERP amplitudes over the occipito-temporal area (N330). In infants, a similar posterior ERP component (N290) was greater for object-incongruent gaze shifts, which suggests that by the age of 9 months infants encode referential information of gaze in a similar way to adults. In addition, in infants we observed an early frontal ERP component (anterior N200), which showed higher amplitude in response to the perception of object-congruent gaze shifts. This component may reflect fast-track processing of socially relevant information, such as the detection of communicative or informative situations, and could form a developmental foundation for attention sharing, social learning and theory of mind

Absolute protein quantification using fluorescence measurements with FPCountR

This paper presents a generalisable method for the calibration of fluorescence readings on microplate readers, in order to convert arbitrary fluorescence units into absolute units. FPCountR relies on the generation of bespoke fluorescent protein (FP) calibrants, assays to determine protein concentration and activity, and a corresponding analytical workflow. We systematically characterise the assay protocols for accuracy, sensitivity and simplicity, and describe an ‘ECmax’ assay that outperforms the others and even enables accurate calibration without requiring the purification of FPs. To obtain cellular protein concentrations, we consider methods for the conversion of optical density to either cell counts or alternatively to cell volumes, as well as examining how cells can interfere with protein counting via fluorescence quenching, which we quantify and correct for the first time. Calibration across different instruments, disparate filter sets and mismatched gains is demonstrated to yield equivalent results. It also reveals that mCherry absorption at 600 nm does not confound cell density measurements unless expressed to over 100,000 proteins per cell. FPCountR is presented as pair of open access tools (protocol and R package) to enable the community to use this method, and ultimately to facilitate the quantitative characterisation of synthetic microbial circuits

Newborns' preference for face-relevant stimuli: effects of contrast polarity

There is currently no agreement as to how specific or general are the mechanisms underlying newborns' face preferences. We address this issue by manipulating the contrast polarity of schematic and naturalistic face-related images and assessing the preferences of newborns. We find that for both schematic and naturalistic face images, the contrast polarity is important. Newborns did not show a preference for an upright face-related image unless it was composed of darker areas around the eyes and mouth. This result is consistent with either sensitivity to the shadowed areas of a face with overhead (natural) illumination and/or to the detection of eye contact

Social cognition

Social cognition concerns the various psychological processes that enable individuals to take advantage of being part of a social group. Of major importance to social cognition are the various social signals that enable us to learn about the world. Such signals include facial expressions, such as fear and disgust, which warn us of danger, and eye gaze direction, which indicate where interesting things can be found. Such signals are particularly important in infant development. Social referencing, for example, refers to the phenomenon in which infants refer to their mothers' facial expressions to determine whether or not to approach a novel object. We can learn a great deal simply by observing others. Much of this signalling seems to happen automatically and unconsciously on the part of both the sender and the receiver. We can learn to fear a stimulus by observing the response of another, in the absence of awareness of that stimulus. By contrast, learning by instruction, rather than observation, does seem to depend upon awareness of the stimulus, since such learning does not generalize to situations where the stimulus is presented subliminally. Learning by instruction depends upon a meta-cognitive process through which both the sender and the receiver recognize that signals are intended to be signals. An example would be the ‘ostensive’ signals that indicate that what follows are intentional communications. Infants learn more from signals that they recognize to be instructive. I speculate that it is this ability to recognize and learn from instructions rather than mere observation which permitted that advanced ability to benefit from cultural learning that seems to be unique to the human race

Images of objects are interpreted as symbols: a case study of automatic size measurement

Are photographs of objects presented on a screen in an experimental context treated as the objects them- selves or are they interpreted as symbols standing for objects? We addressed this question by investigating the size Stroop effect—the finding that people take longer to judge the relative size of two pictures when the real-world size of the depicted objects is incongruent with their display size. In Experiment 1, we repli- cated the size Stroop effect with new stimuli pairs (e.g., a zebra and a watermelon). In Experiment 2, we replaced the large objects in Experiment 1 with small toy objects that usually stand for them (e.g., a toy ze- bra), and found that the Stroop effect was driven by what the toys stood for, not by the toys themselves. In Experiment 3, we showed that the association between an image of a toy and the object the toy typically stands for is not automatic: when toys were pitted against the objects they typically represent (e.g., a toy zebra vs. a zebra), images of toys were interpreted as representations of small objects, unlike in Experiment 2. We argue that participants interpret images as discourse-bound symbols and automatically compute what the images stand for in the discourse context of the experimental situation

Interacting mindreaders

Could interacting mindreaders be in a position to know things which they would be unable to know if they were manifestly passive observers? This paper argues that they could. Mindreading is sometimes reciprocal: the mindreader's target reciprocates by taking the mindreader as a target for mindreading. The paper explains how such reciprocity can significantly narrow the range of possible interpretations of behaviour where mindreaders are, or appear to be, in a position to interact. A consequence is that revisions and extensions are needed to standard theories of the evidential basis of mindreading. The view also has consequences for understanding how abilities to interact combined with comparatively simple forms of mindreading may explain the emergence, in evolution or development, of sophisticated forms of social cognition

Rationality in joint action: maximizing co-efficiency in coordination

When people perform simple actions, they often behave efficiently, minimizing the costs of movement for the expected benefit. The present study addressed the question whether this efficiency scales up to dyads working together to achieve a shared goal: do people act efficiently as a group, or do they minimize their own or their partner’s individual costs even if this increases the overall cost for the group? We devised a novel, touchscreen-based, sequential object transfer task to measure how people choose between different paths to coordinate with a partner. Across multiple experiments, we found that participants did not simply minimize their own or their partner’s movement costs but made co-efficient decisions about paths, which ensured that the aggregate costs of movement for the dyad were minimized. These results suggest that people are able and motivated to make co-efficient, collectively rational decisions when acting together